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Abstract 
 
After 2000, the vast majority of defined benefit (DB) pension plans encountered a 
decrease in their funding ratios, largely due to a drop in asset prices. It is possible that 
public sector pension plans may have acted imprudently by chasing returns, once they 
encountered underfunding. We identify four indicators for DB plans’ imprudent 
investment behavior: no portfolio rebalancing, employer conflicts of interest, trustee 
conflicts of interest, and failure to implement best investment practices. To see if public 
sector pension plans rebalance their portfolios, we use data from the Federal Reserve’s 
Flow of Funds, dating from 1952 to 2007. To test for the remaining three hypotheses, we 
use data from the Census’ State and Local Government Employee Retirement Systems 
data base, where consistent data for state and local government plans are available from 
1993 to 2005. Our results suggest that there is no evidence that public sector plans 
systematically engaged in imprudent investment behavior and that this did not 
systematically differ after 2000 from the earlier period.  
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Manita Rao for her outstanding research assistance. All remaining errors are our sole 
responsibility.  
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I. Introduction 
Defined benefit (DB) pensions for state and local government employees are an 
important source of retirement savings. DB plans offer employees a fixed level of 
retirement income, typically based on years of service, age and prior earnings. Employers 
generally absorb the consequences of the risks associated with the long-term financial 
commitment that a pension plan entails. Employers will have to contribute less to their 
pension plans if financial rates of return are better than expected, and more if rates of 
return are worse than anticipated. The latter was the case after 2000, when funding ratios 
– assets to liabilities – fell and employer contributions subsequently increased.  
Pension plans may attempt to handle a drop in funding in a number of ways. One of 
them is to seek higher returns in the short-run by incurring more portfolio risk. A more 
imprudent portfolio allocation may reflect a weak governance structure, where plan 
trustees fail to exercise caution, thereby demonstrating a classic principal-agent problem. 
Alternatively, a strong governance structure would serve to limit principal-agent 
problems and be mirrored in a move towards a more prudent asset allocation when 
financial demands increase. 
In this article, we are particularly interested in determining whether public sector 
plans responded to underfunding by increasing their risk exposure. To our knowledge, 
this is the first empirical effort to systematically look at the determinants of asset 
allocations by public sector pension plans following the stock market correction of 2000-
2001. We specifically look at the question of whether public sector plans follow prudent 
investment practices. Here we consider the roles that asset prices, pension plan funding, 
past employer contributions, and peer performance play. By looking at the asset 
allocation of public sector plans, this article contributes to the discussion of how public 
sector plans responded to the drop in funding levels that occurred after 2000.  
In general, we find that public sector plans from 1993 to 2006 tended to be prudent in 
their asset allocation – possibly overly so. Public sector plans rebalanced their asset 
allocations regularly in response to large price changes – indicating that managers are 
adhering to their allocation targets. Also, public sector plans tended to hold more risky 
assets when they had higher funding levels. We interpret this as evidence that principals 
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are able to monitor agents and prevent them from taking riskier positions when funding 
ratios are low. Interestingly, this relationship seems to have become stronger after 2000.  
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. We provide an overview of the relevant 
literature in section II, which allows us to identify several portfolio allocation 
determinants. In section III, we provide some background on public sector plans’ asset 
allocations over time. This is followed by a descriptive analysis of the data in section IV 
and a multivariate analysis in section V. We end with some concluding remarks in 
section VI.  
II. Literature Review 
The allocation of retirement portfolios towards risky assets, mainly corporate equities, 
is typically a systematic indicator of the rates of return earned on all assets. For instance, 
Coronado, Engen and Knight (2003) find that a one standard deviation increase in the 
asset allocation towards equities was associated with a rate of return that was 1.3% higher 
in 1998.1 At least in the past, an allocation towards corporate equity has therefore been 
associated with higher rates of return for public sector DB plans.  
Investors’ portfolio allocations are typically based on investors’ risk preferences, 
given the available investment opportunities, and the risk-return trade off (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980; Merton, 1969). The primary asset allocation model typically employed 
follows Merton (1969). The optimal allocation into risky assets, e.g. stocks, is determined 
by the risk-return trade-off between a risky and a risk-free asset:  
2
)(* δσ
raw −=       (1) 
The optimal share of equities, w*, is equal to the ratio of the difference in the expected 
rate of return of equities (a) and that of risk free short-term government bonds (r), relative 
to one-year variance of equity prices ( )2σ  weighted by an investor’s risk preferences, δ. 
Plans, though, may not allocate optimal shares of their assets to specific asset 
classes. This deviation may be explained by a range of factors, including beneficiary 
demographics and plan size (or sponsor strength) (McCarthy and Miles, 2007).  
 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that such past results tend to reflect an equity premium, which may not exist in the 
future. Thus, these results cannot be a guide for future asset allocation decisions.  
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We focus on a number of additional factors to capture prudent investment 
behavior. In particular, we look at portfolio rebalancing, plan and employer conflicts of 
interest, and investor learning. Taken together, we argue that regular rebalancing, the 
nonexistence of conflicts of interest and the existence of investor learning provide 
evidence of prudent investment behavior, based on the existing literature.  
II.1 Indicators for Prudent Investment 
Extraordinarily large movements in equity prices should lead investors to 
reallocate their portfolios. Since the volatility in investment returns has increased, the 
optimal share of equities should decrease as equation (1) suggests provided that investor 
risk preferences remain the same. Additionally, a large upward movement in stock prices 
in one period (such as the late 1990s) increases the probability of below average rates of 
return in the future as asset prices revert to the mean, relative to expected earnings 
(Campbell and Shiller, 1988, 2001). Lower expected rates of return on equities should 
result in fewer stock holdings.  
A third reason why large movements in equity prices are likely to reduce equity 
allocations is that the funding level may impact the plan sponsor’s preference for risk 
taking. The funding ratio – assets relative to liabilities – and the equity allocation are 
likely to be positively correlated. Plan trustees may feel that they have enough of a 
cushion to engage in riskier investment allocations when a plan is well-funded. In 
comparison, underfunded plans, especially those that are well governed, may seek to 
stabilize their funding ratio by reducing their risk exposure. Empirically, there seems to 
be a positive relationship between funding ratios and allocations towards riskier assets. 
Well-funded DB plans in the private sector tend to be more heavily invested in equities 
than less well-funded plans (Rauh, 2007). The same is true for real estate investments 
(Craft, 2005).2  
                                                 
2 Conflicts of interest can arise in public sector DB plans due to politically motivated investment decisions. 
Plan sponsors, for instance, may want to target local economic development or avoid investments in certain 
companies and geographical areas due to political pressures. A small minority of public sector plans 
appears to engage in politically motivated investments, e.g. only 5% of public sector plans reported to have 
economically targeted investments (ETI) in 1998 (Coronado, Engen, and Knight, 2003). Politically 
motivated investment decisions do not seem to impact the overall performance of public plans. Coronado, 
Engen, and Knight (2003) and Munnell and Sunden (2001) conclude that there is no conclusive evidence 
that politically motivated investments adversely impact the rate of return of public sector DB plans. In 
comparison, Mitchell and Hsin (1997) find that public sector DB plans have a lower rate of return than 
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Complicating the optimal allocation decision are a host of factors: poor oversight 
by principles, conflicts of interest, uncertainty and “learning” behavior, as well as 
imitation of industry leaders. When these factors are prevalent they can lead to 
suboptimal investment performance and a deterioration of the funding ratio. For example, 
absent good governance, underfunded plans may adopt riskier portfolios due to the 
prevalence of information asymmetries between the principal (public sector employees) 
and their agents (plan trustees). Plan trustees may find it opportune to increase their risk 
taking, assuming a bailout by the plan sponsor or taxpayers (McCarthy and Miles, 2007; 
Papke, 1991).  
DB plan sponsors may face their own conflict of interest.3 Public sector plan 
sponsors may try to minimize their contributions, at a given level of liabilities. An 
unexpected increase in employer contributions to their pension plans may thus result in a 
change towards riskier asset allocations in an effort to reduce contributions by incurring 
more risk (McCarthy and Miles, 2007).  
Plan investment officers may learn from the investment allocation of other plans. 
Such peer effects seem to exist in the mutual fund industry. Specifically, mutual fund 
managers may mimic the performance of peers, who have shown an outstanding 
performance (Chevallier and Ellison, 1999; Sirri and Tufano, 1998). Similarly, investors 
will imitate each other’s behavior, given that information is naturally limited (Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1993). This may especially apply to public sector plans, where legislative 
and regulatory obstacles have been eliminated over time and plans have moved towards 
riskier asset allocations. Pomorski (2006) finds that learning from leaders can translate 
into higher rates of returns.  
                                                                                                                                                 
large private sector DB plans due to politically motivated investment, although this finding may result from 
the comparison with only large private sector DB plans (Coronado, Engen, and Knight, 2003).  
3 This does not apply to private multi-employer DB plans, which are stand-alone entities (Almeida, 2007). ` 
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II.2 Standard Determinants of Asset Allocation 
In addition to the variables that are meant to capture prudent plan investments, 
there are several variables that are expected to determine a plan’s equity allocation: 
demographics, plan size, and regulatory and legislative restrictions.4 5 
Traditionally, equity holdings were expected to be constant with age (Merton, 
1969; Mossin, 1968; Samuelson, 1969), based on a set of strict assumptions. When these 
assumptions are relaxed, portfolio allocations can fluctuate with age (Ameriks and 
Zeldes, 2004). For instance, labor income is considered a certain, non-tradeable asset by 
assuming the net worth of future income. As the share of labor wealth declines over time, 
households will maintain their share of risk-free wealth in their total portfolio by shifting 
financial assets towards risk-free financial assets, away from equities. Furthermore, if 
equity returns are negatively serially correlated, investors should seek smaller exposures 
to risk as they age and their investment horizon shortens (Barberis, 2000; Campbell and 
Viceira, 1999, 2002; Kandel and Stambaugh, 1996; and Wachter, 2002). Also, changes in 
utility imply a reduction in assets with age because consumers increasingly value certain 
wealth to finance a fixed amount of desired consumption (Samuelson, 1989, 1994) and 
because risk aversion may decrease with age (Bakshi and Chen, 1994; Ballente and 
Green, 2004, and Halek and Eisenhauer, 2001), although the empirical results seem 
inconclusive on this point (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004).  
Consequently, the theory indicates that as the age of the plan’s beneficiaries 
increases, the plan’s allocation towards equities should decline. Specifically, a higher 
dependency ratio – beneficiaries to active participants – should translate into a less risky 
asset allocation.  
Moreover, a plan’s equity allocation may be related to the plan’s size for two 
reasons. First, transactions costs tend to be higher for smaller plans than for larger plans. 
For individual investors, specifically in DC plans, transactions costs tend to be one factor 
that could explain the low equity investments (Haliassos and Bertaut, 1995) and limited 
                                                 
4 Tax policy can influence the asset allocation of private sector pension plans, but should have no bearing 
on public sector pension plans. See Black (1980), Tepper (1981), Papke (1991) and Ameriks and Zeldes 
(2004) for a discussion of the link between tax policy and private pension asset allocations.  
5 Prior research has also found that a plan’s governance structure, specifically independent reviews, can 
influence a plan’s equity allocation (Useem and Mitchell, 2000; Yang and Mitchell, forthcoming).  
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portfolio allocation changes (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; Mitchell, et al., 2006). Fees tend 
to be higher for very small DB plans than for either larger DB plans or DC plans. The 
smallest DB plans (with 15 employees) tend to have expenses equal to 3.1% of assets, 
compared to 1.44% for DC plans (CII, 2006).  
Consequently, it is possible that smaller DB plans are less likely to invest in 
equities. First, transactions costs tend to be higher than in other investments. Second, plan 
trustees may increase a plan’s risk exposure for larger plans. The may be due to their 
ability to diversify across a broad range of investment opportunities, the availability of 
professional staff, and the relatively large impact of small policy changes due to the large 
membership of the plan. Consequently, large sponsors will have more financial resources 
available if downside risk materializes and plans are in need of additional financial 
resources (McCarthy and Miles, 2007). We use plan size as a proxy for the strength of the 
plan sponsor.  
Finally, public sector plans may face institutional and legislative hurdles to investing 
more in riskier assets. Traditionally, public plans have held smaller shares of their assets 
in stocks than private sector plans (Coronado, Engen and Knight, 2003). However, 
restrictions on public plans’ investments have been gradually lifted. Many public sector 
plans are allowed to allocate a growing share of their assets to corporate equities and 
other investments, such as international securities and alternative investments (IFI, 2007; 
Marois, 2007). We include the asset allocation of private DB plans as a benchmark to 
capture the effects of the changing legal and institutional environment for public plans.  
III. Background 
We use two data sets to study the determinants of the asset allocation of public sector 
plans. Aggregate data for all state and local plans are available going back to 1952 from 
the Federal Reserve’s Flow of Funds (BOG, 2007). These data offer the longest time 
horizon and includes flow variables, in particular net purchases of financial assets.  
In addition, the Census’ (2007) annual survey of State and Local Government 
Employee Systems going back to 1993 reports a range of relevant variables for state and 
local plans separately for each state.6 It covers all public sector DB plans and provides 
                                                 
6 Consistent data are available only through 2005 due to a change in the sample.   
 7
relevant variables beyond plans’ finances, such as demographics and benefit payments.7 
In some cases, data on DC plans are included, which represents only a minor problem 
since the preponderance of public sector plans are DB plans and the largest public sector 
DC plans – Teachers’ Insurance Annuity Association (TIAA) – is excluded.  
These two data sets allow us to approximate the determinants of the asset allocation 
of public sector plans and allow for a comparison of the determinants of the asset 
allocation before 2001 and after 2000.  
Public sector plans held slightly more stocks, 0.7 percentage points, than private 
sector DB plans since the 1990s (Table 1). Since 2000, stocks accounted for 60.3% of all 
public plan assets and for 59.6% of private pension plan assets. This allocation followed 
sharp increases in the stock allocation of public plans, particularly in the 1970s and 
1990s. State and local government plans differ slightly in their asset allocation, although 
both types of plans show an increasing equity allocation (Table 2). Local plans had a 
greater allocation to domestic stocks than state plans. In 2005, local plans held 37.2% in 
domestic stocks, compared to 35.8% of state plan assets allocated to domestic stocks. 
This is up from 28.7% and 32.6%, respectively, showing a larger relative increase in the 
equity allocation for local plans than for state plans.  
 
                                                 
7 Aggregate data provide for consistent time series observations for each state at the state and local level. 
Individual plan level data does not offer the same time series consistency due to a change in survey 
methodology and plan survivals and deaths. We thus primarily rely on the aggregate data, although we 
report results based on plan level data to show the robustness of our results.  
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Table 1 
Asset Allocation of Public and Private Sector Pension Plans, Business Cycle Averages 
 
 
Business cycle dates 
 
Stocks 
 
Corporate and foreign 
bonds 
 
 
Treasuries and agency 
debt 
 
Mutual funds 
 
Other investments 
 Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Private 
sector 
Public 
sector 
Sep-1953:Sep-1957 - 1.5 n.a. 23.6 n.a. 44.7 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 30.3 
Dec-1957:Jun-1960 n.a. 2.6 n.a. 32.7 n.a. 33.3 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 31.4 
Sep-1960:Dec-1969 n.a. 7.0 n.a. 48.4 n.a. 22.5 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 22.1 
Mar-1970:Dec-1973 n.a. 21.5 n.a. 56.6 n.a. 8.8 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 13.1 
Mar-1974:Mar-1980 n.a. 22.8 n.a. 55.3 n.a. 11.3 n.a. 0.0 n.a. 10.6 
Jun-1980:Sep-1990 39.8 29.8 10.6 30.9 19.1 28.9 0.8 0.7 29.7 9.6 
Dec-1990:Mar-2001 47.4 52.1 12.1 15.2 16.2 21.1 5.5 4.1 18.8 7.4 
Jun-2001:Jun-2007 
 
59.6 60.3 9.3 9.3 11.5 16.4 10.5 8.7 9.0 5.2 
 
Notes: All figures are percent of total financial assets. Data on private DB plans are available only annually from 1985 onward. Authors’ calculations based on 
BOG (2007). Business cycle dates are taken from the National Bureau of Economic Research’s Business Cycle Data Base (NBER, 2008). Dates are inclusive.  
 9
Table 2 
Asset Allocation of State and Local Government Plans, By Type of Plan and Select Years 
 
  
Stocks 
 
Corporate bonds 
 
Treasuries and agency debt 
 
Other investments 
 
Year Total 
 
State Local Total State Local Total State Local Total State Local 
1995 32.4 32.6 28.7 17.9 18.3 16.8 20.5 20.6 20.9 29.2 28.5 33.6 
2000 35.4 34.6 35.8 16.3 16.4 18.1 12.9 13.2 15.0 35.4 35.8 31.1 
2005 35.8 35.8 37.2 16.0 15.6 15.3 8.6 9.0 11.1 39.1 40.3 34.2 
 
 
            
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on Census (2007). All calculations are based on aggregate data.  
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The equity allocation may be correlated with public sector plan assets’ rate of 
return, defined as investment earnings divided by the average of assets at the start and 
end of a period. Plans with equity allocation shares greater than the median showed a rate 
of return that was approximately half a percentage point higher than for plans that had 
allocation shares less than the median. Based on plan-level data, we also find that larger 
equity allocations tend to go along with higher rates of return, again with a difference of 
about half a percentage point for longer-term investment horizons (Table 3).  
Table 3 
Rates of Return over 1, 3, and 5 Years, by Size of Assets Allocated to Equities 
 
 
Size of allocation towards 
equities 
 
One-year rate of 
return 
 
 
3-year rate of return 
 
5-year rate of return 
Aggregate data 
 
   
Small 8.0 7.0 7.0 
Large 
 
8.1 7.5 7.6 
Plan level data 
 
   
Small 6.6 6.9 7.2 
Large 
 
7.9 7.3 7.6 
Notes: All figures are in percent. Rates of return are averages for 1, 3, and 5 years. Size classes refer to 
quartiles of asset shares allocated to corporate equities averaged over 1, 3, and 5 years. Aggregate data 
exclude system wide observations. Data cover the entire period from 1993 to 2005. Authors’ calculations 
based on Census (2007). 
 
IV. Univariate Analyses 
In this section we study the link between four indicators of prudent investments and 
public sector asset allocation: rebalancing, funding ratios, employer contributions, and 
leader’s asset allocation.  Plans that effectively rebalance their portfolios are viewed as 
more prudent; plans with lower funding ratios have smaller investment in equities, again 
demonstrating prudence. Funds with large increases employer contributions do not 
increase their risk positions. Finally, we find some limited evidence of “follow-the-
leader” behavior. We interpret both of these, cautiously, as evidence of prudence.  
IV.1 Rebalancing 
Large price changes should translate into asset reallocations. We define periods of 
extraordinary price increases as those quarters when equities prices in the previous year 
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increased by more than one and a half standard deviations. We develop measures for two-
year and five-year above trend price increases similarly. Finally, we define periods of 
extraordinary price declines as price drops in excess of one and a half standard 
deviations. We then divide the data from 1952 to 2007 into three subperiods: 
extraordinary increases, extraordinary decreases and tranquil periods. We find 
extraordinary one-year equity price increases preceding 9.2% of the quarters from 1952-
2007, extraordinary two-year increases preceding 7.5% of the quarters, and extraordinary 
5-year increases preceding 6.9% of the quarters. The shares for extraordinary decreases 
were 8.1%, 8.1%, and 10.2%, respectively.  
Next, we test if the changes in the equity allocation immediately following 
extraordinary price changes were significantly different from those following tranquil 
periods and if the size of the differences were consistent with the hypothesis that public 
plans rebalanced their portfolios.8 Pension plans should increase their stock purchases 
immediately following price declines and decrease them after prices have just risen. 
These changes should be larger than during tranquil periods.  
We use three rebalancing measures. First, we use the percent change of net stock 
purchases following a period of extraordinary price changes relative to the relevant 
preceding periods. We sum over several quarters and then calculate the percent change to 
reduce the inherent data volatility. Our reference periods are 4, 8, and 20 quarters. 
Second, we use the percentage point change in the ratio of net purchases relative to stock 
holdings. Third, we consider the percentage point change in the ratio of stocks relative to 
total assets, although this variable captures both active portfolio rebalancing and price 
changes. In all instances, we calculate the same ratios also for private retirement plans, 
which include defined contribution plans.  
Finally, we undertake all of our tests for the full sample and then for the period 
after 1982. The years after 1982 was characterized by a stock market boom that increased 
the need for regular rebalancing and defined contribution plans gained in popularity with 
the onset of 401(k) plans, which may have influenced portfolio allocation practices.9  
                                                 
8 We also used Kruskall-Wallis tests due to the small sample sizes, which generate robust results.  
9 This may serve as an indicator for the period after 2000, for which we do not have enough observations.  
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The statistically significant changes typically confirm the hypotheses that public 
plans rebalance their portfolios after price changes (Table 4). For instance, five of the 
twelve tests for differences in percent changes in net purchases are statistically 
significant. Four of these five test statistics have the expected sign. The second measure – 
changes in net purchases relative to total value of stocks – shows no statistically 
significant difference following periods of large price changes, while the third measure 
indicates again more statistically significant tests with the expected sign (5) than with the 
unexpected sign (3). There is no systematic difference between price increases or price 
declines, nor is there a systematic difference between the full sample and the period after 
1982.  
There are differences between public and private sector plans in all three 
measures used. With the first measure, we see several statistically significant differences 
with an unexpected sign, suggesting that private sector plans disproportionately increased 
their purchases after they got more expensive and reduced their purchases 
disproportionately after stock prices had declined. In the case of net stock purchases 
relative to the outstanding value of stocks, which showed no differences for public sector 
plans, we find three instances with the expected sign and two with the unexpected sign. 
That is, this measure does not provide any clear support for or against our hypotheses. 
Only changes in the ratio of stocks to financial assets indicate that stocks increased faster 
as a share of assets after price declines and slower after price increases than during 
tranquil periods.  
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Table 4 
Tests for Portfolio Changes after Extraordinary Price Changes, 1952 to 2007 
 
   
Change in net purchases 
 
Change in net purchases 
to stocks 
 
Change in stocks to total 
financial assets 
 
 Exp. 
Sign 
Public Private Public Private Public Private 
Full 
sample 
       
Price 
increases 
       
1-year "-" -0.148 0.689 0.683 0.321 2.144** 2.536*** 
2-year "-" 0.002 -1.768** -0.469 1.919** -1.279 0.568 
5-year "-" 3.863*** -0.090 0.451 -1.952** -2.123** -0.466 
Price 
declines 
       
1-year "+" -2.080*** -0.065 -1.156 -2.121** 1.413 -0.153 
2-year "+" 0.784 5.052*** 0.507 -0.698 -2.336** 0.258 
5-year "+" -0.564 -0.068 -0.786 0.525 -5.099*** -2.073** 
After 
1982 
       
Price 
increases 
       
1-year "-" -0.169 -0.352 -0.051 0.083 0.679 1.466* 
2-year "-" -0.228 -1.414 -0.409 1.767** -0.672 -0.268 
5-year "-" 2.945*** -2.121** 0.208 -1.450* -2.525** -4.252*** 
Price 
declines 
       
1-year "+" -2.041*** -2.088** -0.714 -3.883*** 2.843*** -1.335 
2-year "+" 0.197 6.011*** 0.382 -0.243 -1.526* -0.878 
5-year 
 
"+" 4.960*** -0.093 0.666 0.005 -1.930** -2.860*** 
Notes: For price increases, the hypothesis is that following these periods plans rebalance by selling stock 
more aggressively than they did during tranquil periods, i.e. a positive sign. For price declines, the 
hypothesis is that immediately following these plans increase equities shares relative to tranquil periods. * 
indicates significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates 
significance at the 1%-level.  
 
Our tests suggest two tentative conclusions. First, public plans actively rebalance 
their portfolios. Second, the evidence in favor of active rebalancing is stronger for public 
sector plans than for private sector retirement savings plans.  
IV.2 Funding Ratios and Equity Allocation 
All types of retirement benefit plans exhibited similar improvements in funding 
ratios during the 1990s followed by declines in funding ratios after 2002 (Munnell et al., 
2007). The strong stock market performance and higher interest rates contributed to 
funding ratios that exceeded 100% in the late 1990s. Starting in 2002, though, lower 
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interest rates and much lower stock prices translated into lower funding ratios, which fell 
below 80% for private sector plans and below 90% for public sector plans on average. 
However, by 2006, plans had recovered some of their earlier losses (Munnell et al., 
2007).  
We calculate a proxy for liabilities since aggregate data only cover benefit 
payments (Census, 2007). We assume that the median ratio of benefit payments to 
liabilities that held for plans in the PENDAT data set between 1998 and 2000 holds for 
all plans here.10. The median ratio of benefit payments to liabilities was 5.7% for those 
years.  
We also assume that liabilities move in line with a plan’s age profile. The ratio of 
beneficiaries to active participants is used as an approximation of the age profile of a 
plan. We index each system’s ratio of beneficiaries to active participants with 1999 as the 
base year. Liabilities are allowed to change with the dependency ratio in addition to 
changes in benefit payments. Specifically, liabilities for each system are calculated as:  
)(
057.0
AgeIndexBL =    (2) 
Where L are the proxied liabilities, B are benefit payments, and AgeIndex is the 
dependency ratio indexed to 1999 for each system. The resulting funding ratios, weighted 
by asset size, for each year show the familiar pattern of improving funding ratios in the 
late 1990s, a sharp drop off after 2001 and stabilization in 2006.11  
We create three categories of funding ratios to facilitate our evaluation. 
Specifically, funding ratios of less than 80% are considered “severely underfunded”, 
between 80% and 100% “mildly underfunded”, and funding ratios above 100% “funded”.  
The results of our analysis are presented in Table 5. We find that mildly 
underfunded plans tend to have lower equity allocations Severely underfunded public 
sector DB plans tend to invest less than better funded plans in domestic stocks and more 
in government securities. These trends are even more pronounced, when we consider plan 
                                                 
10 These years are are in the middle of the Census (2007) data series and ensure sufficient observations.  
11 Authors’ calculations based on Census (2007). Assets are reported here as total assets at market value. 
Since most public DB plans will likely use some form of smoothing to reduce swings in asset values in the 
calculation of plan funding ratios, our calculation will show larger swings in funding ratios than is likely 
the case for actuarial funding ratios.  
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level data instead of aggregate data. The figures thus indicate that underfunding goes 
along with smaller equity allocations.   
Table 5 
Asset Allocation of State and Local Government Retirement Plans by Funding 
Levels 
 
 
Shares of financial 
assets 
 
 
Funding level: 
<80% 
 
Funding level: 
80%-100% 
 
Funding level: 
>100% 
Aggregate data 
 
   
Domestic stocks 28.7 
- 
35.7 
(-3.67***) 
34.6 
(-3.55***) 
Corporate and foreign 
bonds 
15.6 
- 
18.2 
(-1.93*) 
17.1 
(-1.31) 
Treasuries and agency 
debt 
15.9 
- 
11.3 
(2.16**) 
16.2 
(-0.18) 
Other investments 
 
39.4 
- 
34.7 
(1.76*) 
32.4 
(3.05***) 
Plan level data 
 
   
Domestic stocks 36.6 
- 
37.2 
(-3.42***) 
39.1 
(-2.87***) 
Corporate and foreign 
bonds 
24.5 
- 
22.9 
(1.36) 
19.6 
(1.13) 
Treasuries and agency 
debt 
11.3 
- 
13.1 
(-1.483) 
18.0 
(-7.265***) 
Other investments 
 
29.8 
- 
 
29.2 
(0.349) 
25.5 
(4.025***) 
Notes: Authors’ calculations based on Census (2007). Figures in parentheses are t-test statistics for testing 
the null hypothesis the respective shares are the same as for pension systems with severe underfunding. * 
indicates significance at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level and *** indicates 
significance at the 1%-level. A positive sign indicates that the allocation share for systems with severe 
underfunding is greater than the share for other systems and a negative sign indicates that the share of 
systems with severe underfunding is smaller.  
 
IV.3 Employer Contributions and Equity Allocation 
Plan sponsors (employers) may try to minimize their contributions in any given 
year, given fixed liability levels. Following an increase in employer contributions, plan 
sponsors may pursue a riskier allocation strategy in the short-term.  
First, we identify periods when employer contributions rose unexpectedly. These 
are periods when percentage point changes in employer contributions relative to outflows 
– the sum of benefit payments and withdrawals – increased by more than half a standard 
deviation above the average change for that plan type. When we use aggregate data, for 
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instance, 3.3% of quarterly observations are classified as periods with unexpected 
increases system wide, compared to 8.1% for state plans and 0.7% for local plans.  
There is no evidence suggesting that plans seek more risk in the year following an 
unexpected increase in employer contributions (Table 6). These results are robust even 
for small samples as the Mann-Whitney ranksum test indicates.  
Table 6 
Tests for Faster Stock Allocation after Unexpected Employer Contribution 
Increases 
 
  
System wide 
data 
 
 
State plans 
(aggregate) 
 
Local plans 
(aggregate) 
 
State plans 
(plan data) 
 
Local plans 
(plan data) 
t-test -1.304 -1.410 0.000 0.034 0.721 
Mann-Whitney test 
 
-0.047 -1.356 -0.225 0.292 0.802 
Notes: Mann-Whitney test is a ranksum test, used here to the small sample sizes to demonstrate robustness 
of the results. In each case, the null hypothesis that the average change in the period after an unexpected 
change is the same as the average change during all other periods. A negative sign indicates that change in 
the stock allocation immediately following an unexpected change in employer contributions is greater than 
during other periods, while a positive sign indicates that the average change immediately following an 
unexpected increase in employer contributions is smaller than during other periods. * indicates significance 
at the 10%-level, ** indicates significance at the 5%-level, and *** indicates significance at the 1%-level.  
 
IV.4 Leader Investments and Equity Allocation 
We also try to get a sense if pension plans follow each other’s investment 
strategies. We first identify the best performer in each period based on a plan’s rate of 
return. Plans that have the highest rate of return in a given year are “leaders”. Next, we 
compare the changes in asset allocation for leaders during the year, when they are 
leaders, with changes of asset allocations of all plans in the following year.  
There is limited evidence that public sector plans “follow the leader”. Only in 
about 50% of the cases, regardless of the asset class and regardless of the level of 
aggregation, do followers follow the lead of leaders, either up or down (Table 7).  
There seems to be a difference between state and local plans with respect to 
equity allocations. For instance, among state plans, followers increased or decreased their 
equity allocation in 51.2% of the cases after leaders did the same in the preceding period, 
based on aggregate data. Based on fund level data, this was true for 44.6% of cases 
(Table 7). Among local plans, followers followed leaders in 46.2% of cases, based on 
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aggregate data, and 33.5% of instances, based on fund level data. This suggests that state 
plans are somewhat more likely to follow the leader, than local plans.  
Table 7 
Share of Allocation Changes, when Leaders and Followers Move in the Same 
Direction 
 
  
Changes in 
stocks to 
assets 
 
Changes in 
bonds to 
assets 
 
 
Changes in 
govt. debt to 
assets 
 
Changes in 
other 
investments to 
assets 
Aggregate data     
State and local plans     
Leaders and followers increase 26.2 21.1 12.6 28.1 
Leaders and followers decrease 19.8 32.2 43.0 20.8 
State plans     
Leaders and followers increase 36.6 28.7 13.5 21.5 
Leaders and followers decrease 14.8 26.8 41.0 28.4 
Local plans     
Leaders and followers increase 7.0 12.2 10.2 21.3 
Leaders and followers decrease 
 
39.2 40.6 33.5 20.3 
Plan level data     
State plans     
Leaders and followers increase 25.5 29.0 9.6 17.6 
Leaders and followers decrease 19.1 20.1 47.0 30.4 
Local plans     
Leaders and followers increase 33.5 39.2 0.0 n.a. 
Leaders and followers decrease 
 
0.0 0.0 53.0 n.a. 
Notes: All figures are in percent. Figures are shares of all allocation changes in specified asset category. 
Only instances are considered, where leaders and followers move in the same direction in subsequent 
periods. 
 
V. Multivariate Analysis 
The discussion over asset allocations is typically concerned with factors that could 
raise or lower the actual asset allocation above or below its optimal level. The definition 
of the optimal allocation towards stocks is laid out in equation (1) in the previous 
discussion. We assume a constant risk parameter of 5 as an indication of trustees’ risk 
neutrality, which is consistent with other studies (McCarthy and Miles, 2007). The rate of 
return on stocks is the annual rate of appreciation of the S&P500 plus the average annual 
dividend yield. The variance of the risky asset is the variance of the total rate of return on 
stocks, based on data for the S&P 500, from 1953 forward to each data year.  
Our interest lies in explaining the deviation of the stock allocation from its 
optimum. Our regression equation is thus:  
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Where w* denotes the optimal share of assets allocated to corporate equities, SizeInd 
refers to the four size groupings discussed earlier, LStocks and LFinAssets are the stock 
holdings and financial assets of the leader in the previous period, and PStocks and 
PFinAssets are the stock holdings and financial assets of private sector DB plans.  
In addition to the variables used to measure prudent investment, we include plan 
size, dependency ratio and the equity allocation of private sector DB plans as explanatory 
variables. The dependency ratio is the ratio of beneficiaries to active participants and plan 
size is an indicator variable that takes on values from “1” to “4”, depending on whether 
the plan fell into the first, second, third, or fourth size quartile in any given year.  
The first regression shows the baseline model for system wide aggregate data 
(Table 8). All explanatory variables either have the expected sign or are statistically 
insignificant. Specifically, public plans’ equity allocation increases when equity 
allocations by leaders private sector DB plans and increase in the previous period.  
Next, we re-estimate the regression focusing on whether the determinants of 
public sector plans’ equity allocation differed systematically after 2000. Specifically, we 
include a dummy variable that takes on the value of one for the years after 2000 and zero 
otherwise. We also include two interaction terms: one for the funding ratio after 2000 and 
one for employer contributions after 2000 since those are the variables that capture 
conservative or aggressive investment strategies.  
The determinants of public sector plans’ equity allocations are largely robust 
before and after 2000, with one exception. Specifically, the equity allocation is positively 
correlated with the funding ratio prior to 2000, but there is no clear link after 2000 (Table 
8).  
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We re-estimate the regression equation with a slightly altered definition of the 
funding ratio to show the robustness of our results.12 We now use the ratio of assets to 
(estimated) liabilities without adjusting for changes in the dependency ratio. Our previous 
results remain robust (Table 8). In addition, we find that plans tend to increase their 
equity allocation with higher funding levels and after employer contributions 
unexpectedly increased. Specifically, public plans’ equity allocation tends to increase 
with higher funding levels, lower employer contributions, while also following the lead 
of strong performers and experienced plans. These results remain stable, when we 
exclude the dependency ratio from the regression, which is done to show the 
comparability with the regression results for state and local plans, as discussed further 
below. Our results suggest that public sector plans learn from performance leaders, but 
are not influenced by plan sponsor and trustee conflicts of interests.  
When we again include the dummy variable for years after 2000 and the 
interaction terms, the results are generally robust. However, greater employer 
contributions are followed by smaller equity allocations, but only after 2000 (Table 8). 
While this suggests that public sector plans are not influenced by employer conflicts of 
interests, it may indicate that plans became overly cautious in the face of quickly rising 
employer contributions after 2000.13  
We can estimate the last regression also for state and local plans separately since 
demographic data are not available for these plans at the aggregate level. There seem to 
                                                 
12 We also estimated the regression equation based on fund level data. Aggregate data are preferable for a 
number of reasons, though. While the fund level data allow for more observations, they have the problem 
that they do not provide a consistent time series. For one, plans move in and out of the sample and second, 
the Census methodology changed to a survey design half way through our sampling period, which 
drastically reduced the number of annual observations. Moreover, there are substantial data limitations for 
local plans. Nevertheless, the fund level regression results are generally robust, but show two important 
differences from the results based on aggregate data. First, we find that plans with more assets tend to have 
a larger share of their assets allocated to equities. Second, state level plans do not follow the leader, but 
rather seem to do the opposite of what performance leaders did in the previous period. If we include an 
interactive term between plan size indicators for moderate, large, and very large plans and the leader’s 
stock allocation as additional explanatory variables, we find that smaller state plans tend to move in the 
opposite direction from the asset allocation of performance leaders, while the equity allocation of very 
large plans is either not systematically connected to the equity allocation of performance leaders or may 
even follow it. That is, our results suggest that in the aggregate public sector plans tend to imitate the 
investment behavior of performance leaders, although the opposite seems to be the case for smaller plans. 
13 Table 2 also shows that there was no clear trend towards other investments. Also, while the allocation 
towards international securities increased, the allocation towards real estate remained relatively stable 
according to our calculations based on Census (2007).  
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be some noticeable differences between state and local plans (Table 9). The funding ratio 
and the leader’s previous equity allocation are significant determinants of the allocation 
of state plans’ assets, but not of local plans’. In comparison, size and employer 
contributions matter for the asset allocation of local plans, but not for state plans. Both 
types of plans, though, seem to follow the lead of private sector DB plans. Although the 
exact mechanism differ, both types of plans seem to follow experience and do not seem 
to rely on implicit taxpayer guarantees to pursue riskier investment strategies when 
funding ratios decline or demands on employers increase.  
The results remain largely robust when we include a dummy for years after 2000 
and interaction terms, although there are some differences with respect to two variables 
of particular interest to us – the funding ratio and employer contributions. Specifically, 
the allocation towards stocks is positively related with higher funding ratios for state and 
local plans. This difference is much weaker after 2000 than before for state plans, but 
shows no difference over time for local plans (Table 9). In addition, employer 
contributions in the previous period have no systematic relationship to the allocation 
towards stocks by state and local plans before 2000, but there is a statistically significant 
link after 2000. Again, this suggests no employer conflicts of interest, but it may indicate 
an overly cautious investment allocation after rapid changes in employer contributions.  
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Table 8 
Regression Results for Determinants of Equity Allocation, System Wide Aggregate Data 
 Coeff. Std. 
Dev. 
Coeff. Std. 
Dev. 
Coeff. Std. 
Dev. 
Coeff. Std. 
Dev. 
Coeff. Std. 
Dev. 
Coeff. Std. 
Dev. 
Dependency ratio 0.251 0.462 -0.526 0.467 0.390 0.429 -0.393 0.453     
Lagged funding ratio -0.012 0.009 0.125 0.081         
Funding ratio times 
indicator after 2000 (lagged) 
  -0.125 0.081         
Lagged funding ratio (alt.)     0.165*** 0.058 0.070** 0.076 0.169*** 0.058 0.589 0.075 
Funding ratio (alt.) times 
indicator after 2000 (lagged) 
      0.122 0.089   0.136 0.088 
Size indicator 0.007 0.264 0.031 0.252 0.031 0.263 0.073 0.251 0.029 0.263 0.075 0.251 
Lagged leader's stock 
allocation 
2.157*** 0.363 4.190*** 0.494 2.002*** 0.364 4.170*** 0.494 2.005*** 0.364 4.164*** 0.494 
Lagged employer 
contribution to outflows 
0.225* 0.129 0.124 0.273 -0.488* 0.256 0.186 0.307 -0.532*** 0.252 0.227 0.303 
Emp. cont. to outflows 
times indicator after 2000 
(lagged) 
  -0.492* 0.288   -1.223*** 0.337   -1.206*** 0.337 
Lagged private DB plan 
stock share 
8.127*** 1.014 27.991*** 3.089 6.701*** 1.056 28.189*** 3.138 6.781*** 1.056 27.837*** 3.112 
Indicator for years after 
2000 
  -2.236*** 0.364   -2.2104*** 0.364   -2.202*** 0.364 
Constant -5.296*** 0.838 -14.912*** 1.678 -4.429*** 0.879 -15.133*** 1.717 -4.274*** 0.861 -15.16*** 1.716 
             
N 623  623  623  623  623  623  
F-statistic 28.97***  27.75***  30.28***  28.67***  36.18***  32.17  
R-squared 0.235  0.308  0.243  0.315  0.242  0.314  
Notes: All regressions include plan fixed effects. * indicates significance at 10%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and *** indicates significance at 
1%-level.  
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Table 9 
Regression Results for Determinants of Asset Allocation, State and Local Plans, Aggregate Data 
 
 State Plans Local Plans 
 Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. Coeff. Std. Dev. 
         
Funding ratio times indicator 
after 2000 (lagged) 
  -0.921*** 0.138   0.127 0.098 
Size indicator -0.017 0.235 0.184 0.195 0.405* 0.222 0.429** 0.221 
Lagged leader's stock 
allocation 
3.410*** 0.296 6.850*** 0.346 0.150 0.260 0.293 0.259 
Lagged employer contribution 
to outflows 
0.063 0.291 0.504 0.274 -0.626** 0.286 -0.140 0.342 
Employer contributions to 
outflows times indicator after 
2000 (lagged) 
  -1.350*** 0.346   -1.163*** 0.392 
Lagged private DB plan stock 
share 
8.993 0.883 48.527*** 2.570 10.055*** 1.138 14.381*** 2.896 
Indicator for years after 2000   -3.668*** 0.275   -0.110 0.296 
Constant -8.447*** 0.827 -27.722*** 1.384 -6.416*** 0.960 -8.764*** 1.642 
         
N 608  608  545  545  
         
F-statistic 83.80***  109.65***  27.03***  19.50***  
         
R-squared 
 
0.432  0.615  0.216  0.242  
 
Notes: All regressions include plan fixed effects. * indicates significance at 10%-level, ** indicates significance at 5%-level and *** indicates significance at 
1%-level.  
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VI. Conclusion 
 
In the wake of declining funding ratios for public sector plans, their professional 
management has occasionally been criticized. Well-governed defined benefit pensions 
follow prudent investment plans and use best practices in their management. Thus, we 
study the determinants of public plans’ equity allocations with a particular focus on the 
years after 2000. We examine whether public sector plans regularly rebalance, avoid 
employer and trustee conflicts of interests and learn from the investment experiences of 
others.  
Our descriptive statistics and multivariate analyses of public sector plan data from 
1993 to 2006 indicate that public plans tend to be prudent in their asset allocation – 
possibly overly so. For one, public sector plans tend to rebalance their assets regularly in 
response to large price changes. Moreover, public sector plans hold less risky assets when 
they have lower funding ratios. Had this not been the case, we would interpret this as 
increased risk taking by trustees. Had trustees adopted riskier equity allocations in the 
face of funding shortfalls we would have been concerned that this represented a conflict 
of interests, and that trustees’ fallback position would be a bailout by the plan sponsor or 
taxpayers. The fact that trustees choose lower equities exposure when funding ratios are 
low indicates that trustee conflicts of interests are not prevalent.  
We were also encouraged to find that the equity allocations are larger in the period 
after we observe higher funding levels, suggesting that trustees wait to know what their 
financial situation is, before they change the risk exposure of their portfolio. Finally, 
public sector plans tend to hold smaller shares of equities when demands on employers in 
the form of higher contributions increase. This relationship seems to have become 
stronger after 2000, which suggests that public sector plans not only avoided employer 
conflicts of interest as larger demands on employers in the previous period translate into a 
“flight from risk”, but may have become overly cautious in their asset allocation 
following large underfunding.  
 
 24
References:  
 
Almeida, B., 2007, Multi-employer Plans: Plan Design of the Future, in Ghilarducci, T., 
and Weller, C., eds., Employee Pensions: Policies, Problems, and Possibilities, 
Labor and Employment Relations Association Series, Ithaca, NY: ILR Press, 
Cornell University Press.  
 
Ameriks, J., and Zeldes, S., 2004, How Do Household Portfolio Shares Vary with Age?, 
Working Paper, Graduate School of Business, Columbia University of Business, 
New York, NY.  
 
Bakshi, G.S., and Chen, Z., 1994, Baby Boom, Population Aging, and Capital Markets, 
Journal of Business 67, No.2: 165-202 
 
Ballente, D., and Green, C.A., 2004, Relative Risk Aversion among the Elderly, Review 
of Financial Economics 13, No. 3: 269-281.  
 
Barberis, N., 2000, Investing for the Long Run When Returns are Predictable, Journal of 
Finance 55, No.1:225-264.  
 
Black, F., 1980, The Tax Consequences of Long Run Pension Policy, Financial Analysts 
Journal (September-October):17-23.  
 
Board of Governors, Federal Reserve System, 2007, Flow of Funds Accounts of the 
United States, Washington, DC: BOG.  
 
Campbell, J. Y., and Shiller, R. J., 1988, Stock Prices, Earnings, and Expected Dividends, 
Journal of Finance, 43(3): 661–676.  
 
Campbell, J.Y., and Shiller, R., 2001, Valuation Ratios and the Long-Run Stock Market 
Outlook: An Update, NBER Working Paper No. 8221, Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
Campbell, J.Y., and Viceira, L.M., 1999, Consumption and Portfolio Decisions when 
Expected Returns are Time Varying, Quarterly Journal of Economics 114, 
No.2:433-495.  
 
Campbell, J.Y., and Viceira, L.M., 2002, Strategic Asset Allocation: Portfolio Choice for 
Long-Term Investors, New York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
 
Chevalier, J.A. and Ellison, G.D., 1999, Career Concerns of Mutual Fund Managers, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 389-432. 
 
Coronado, J.L., Engen, E.M., and Knight, B., 2003, Public Funds and Private Capital 
Markets: The Investment Practices and Performance of State and Local Pension 
Funds, National Tax Journal, 61, No.3: 579-594.  
 25
 
Council of Institutional Investors, 2006, Protecting the Nest Egg: A Primer on Defined 
Benefit and Defined Contribution Retirement Plans, Washington, DC: CII.  
 
Craft, T., 2005, How Funding Ratios Affect Pension Plan Portfolio Allocations, Journal 
of Real Estate Portfolio Management 11, No.1: 29-35.  
 
Grossman, S., and Stiglitz, J.E., 1980, On the Impossibility of Informational Efficient 
Capital Markets, American Economic Review, 70, No. 3: 393-408.  
 
Halek, M., and Eisenhauer, J., 2001, Demography and Risk Aversion, Journal of Risk 
and Insurance 68, No.1: 1-24.  
 
Haliassos, M., and Bertaut, C.C., 1995, Why Do So Few Hold Stocks?, The Economic 
Journal 105, No.432:1110-1129.  
 
International Fund Investment, 2007, Teacher Retirement System of Texas Goes More 
Alternative, April 19, www.ifilive.com.  
 
Jegadeesh, N., and Titman, S., 1993, Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: 
Implications for Stock Market Efficiency, Journal of Finance, 48, 65-91. 
 
Kandel, S., and Stambaugh, R., 1996, On the Predictability of Stock Returns: An Asset 
Allocation Perspective, Journal of Finance, 51: 385-424.  
 
Marois, M., 2007, Calpers May Move $29 Billion out of Stocks and Bonds (Update 1), 
December 13, Bloomberg.com.  
 
McCarthy, D., and Miles, D., 2007, Optimal Portfolio Allocation for Pension Funds in 
the Presence of Background Risk, unpublished manuscript, London, UK: London 
School of Economics,  
 
Merton, R.C., 1969, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty: The Continuous 
Time Case, Review of Economics and Statistics, 247-257. 
 
Mitchell, O. and Hsin, P. L., 1997, Public Pension Governance and Performance, in The 
Economics of Pensions: Principles, Policies, and International Experience, edited 
by S. Valdes–Prieto, 92–123. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Mitchell, O., Mottola, G., Utkus, S., and Yamaguchi, T., 2006, The Inattentive 
Participant: Portfolio Trading Behavior in 401(k) Plans, PRC WP 2006-5, 
Philadelphia, PA: Pension Research Council, Wharton School, University of 
Pennsylvania.  
 
Mossin, J., 1968, Optimal Multi-period Portfolio Policies, Journal of Business 41, No. 2: 
205-225.  
 26
 
Munnell, A., and Sundén, A., 2001, Investment Practices of State and Local Pension 
Funds: Implications for Social Security Reform, In Pensions in the Public Sector, 
edited by Olivia S. Mitchell. 2001. 
 
Papke, L., 1991, The Asset Allocation of Private Pension Plans, NBER Working Paper 
No. 3745, Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
Pomorski, L., 2006, Follow the Leader: Peer Effects in Mutual Fund Portfolio Decisions, 
unpublished manuscript, Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of 
Toronto.  
 
Rauh, J., 2007, Risk Shifting versus Risk Management: Investment Policy in Corporate 
Pension Plans, NBER Working Paper No. 13240, Cambridge, MA: National 
Bureau of Economic Research.  
 
Samuelson, P.A., 1994, The Long-term Case for Equities and How it Can Be Oversold, 
The Journal of Portfolio Management: 15-24.  
 
Samuelson, P.A., 1989, A Case at Last for Age-phased Reduction in Equity, Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Sciences 86: 9048-9051.  
 
Samuelson, P.A., 1963, Lifetime Portfolio Selection by Dynamic Stochastic 
Programming, Review of Economics and Statistics 51: 239-243.  
 
Sirri, E.R. and Tufano, P., 1998, Costly Search and Mutual Fund Flows, Journal of 
Finance, 53, 1589-1622. 
 
Tepper, I., 1981, Taxation and Corporate Pension Policy, Journal of Finance, (March): 1-
13.  
 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2007, State and Local Government Employee Retirement Systems, 
Washington, DC: Census.  
 
Useem, M. and Mitchell, O.S., 2000, Holders of the Purse Strings: Governance and 
Performance of Public Retirement Systems, Social Science Quarterly. 81(2) June 
2000: 489-506. 
 
Wachter, J.A., 2002, Portfolio and Consumption Decisions under Mean-Reverting 
Returns: An Exact Solution for Complete Markets, Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 37, No.1:63. 
 
Yang, T., Mitchell, O. S., forthcoming, Public Pension Governance, Funding, and 
Performance: A Longitudinal Appraisal, in Pension Fund Governance: A Global 
Perspective, eds. John Evans and John Piggott. Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar.  
